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Precautionary Measures of the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights: Legal Status and Importance
by Diego Rodríguez-Pinzón*
In recent years, several states of the Americas have raised concerns regarding the mandate and practice of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (the Commission, 
IACHR) in several areas, including the adoption of precautionary 
measures. In order to better understand the legal underpinnings 
of such discussion, it is important 
to review the scope and normative 
contours of precautionary measures 
in the Inter-American Human Rights 
System. This piece intends to provide 
a general overview of some of the 
most notable aspects that inform the 
current debate in the political organs 
of the Organization of American States 
(OAS). The information provided below 
will indicate that, contrary to what some 
states argue, the Commission’s practice 
in precautionary measures has been cau-
tious but quite effective.
As defined by the Commission, 
precautionary measures are “urgent 
requests, directed to an OAS Member State, to take immediate 
injunctive measures in serious and urgent cases, and whenever 
necessary [. . .] to prevent irreparable harm to persons.”1 The 
Commission primarily grants precautionary measures to protect 
persons from grave and imminent danger of injury of rights rec-
ognized under the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties 
of Man (American Declaration) or the American Convention on 
Human Rights (American Convention). Interim measures devel-
oped based on the understanding that it is essential for the victims 
of human rights abuses to be able to resort to regional systems, 
such as the Inter-American Human Rights System, to seek imme-
diate protection of their basic rights recognized under regional 
international treaties. In general, these measures constitute one of 
the most important instruments that the Commission has at its dis-
posal to achieve one of the core aims of the Inter-American Human 
Rights System: preventing on-going human rights violations.  
normatIVe human rIghtS Structure of the oaS
As the principle multilateral treaty, the Charter of the 
Organization of American States (OAS Charter) sets out the 
legal architecture of this Organization,2 and is binding on 
all OAS Member States. Under Article 106 of the Charter, 
the primary function of the Commission is to “promote the 
observance and protection of human rights and to serve as a 
consultative organ of the [OAS] in these matters.” The notion 
of “protection” necessarily involves the 
power to receive and adjudicate human 
rights cases. Thus, every American 
state has accepted the competence 
of the Commission to consider indi-
vidual complaints concerning alleged 
human rights violations that occur 
in their jurisdiction just by ratifying 
the Charter.3
For those states that have not yet 
ratified the American Convention, the 
Commission will determine whether 
the state violated the rights set forth 
in the American Declaration.4 The 
Commission and the Inter-American 
Court have both held that the 
Declaration, although not initially adopted as a legally bind-
ing treaty, is now a source of legal obligation for OAS Member 
States.5 Additionally, by approving the Commission’s Statute, 
Member States have established the Commission’s authority 
to receive and decide individual complaints alleging viola-
tions of the Declaration against those who are not parties to 
the Convention.6 Furthermore, the Commission has read the 
Declaration as an evolving source of law, noting that its applica-
tion is consistent with the practice of the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights.7 Therefore, the Declaration serves as a paral-
lel to the American Convention for those states that have not 
ratified the Convention.
The requirement of extreme gravity and urgency to obtain 
a grant of precautionary measures presumes the existence of 
certain imminent danger that could result in irreparable harm 
to the fundamental rights of persons.8 Article 25 of the Rules 
of Procedure of the Commission, regulating its precautionary 
measures, reflects comparable elements of gravity, urgency, and 
irreparability recognized for the Inter-American Court in Article 
63 of the American Convention.9 The mechanism established 
in Article 25 of the Rules applies to all of the Member States 
of the OAS, whether or not they have ratified the American 
Convention, by virtue of the Commission’s Statute.
Timely implementation is often of grave importance when a 
precautionary measure is requested, particularly where the life 
or physical integrity of persons are at stake. For those facing 
capital punishment, the implementation of the precautionary 
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measure granted by the Commission is especially important. The 
Commission has stated that
[T]he failure of a member state to preserve a condemned 
prisoner’s life pending review by the Commission of 
his or her complaint emasculates the efficacy of the 
Commission’s process, deprives condemned persons of 
their right to petition in the Inter-American system, and 
results in serious and irreparable harm to those indi-
viduals, and accordingly is inconsistent with the state’s 
human rights obligations.10
The fact that the precautionary measures of the Commission 
are not explicitly included in the text of the American Convention 
or the Commission’s Statute has raised questions from a few 
countries regarding the authority that 
supports such measures. Furthermore, 
even if a sufficient basis exists for the 
authorizations of such measures, the 
question remains whether non-com-
pliance with the measures constitutes 
a failure to fulfill an international obli-
gation of the State.
legal authorIty of the 
commISSIon’S  
PrecautIonary meaSureS
The Commission has the power to 
interpret the scope of its own compe-
tence and jurisdiction.11 In exercising such generic authority, the 
Commission has found that this authority included precautionary 
measures under Article 25 of the Rules of Procedures because
OAS member states, by creating the Commission 
and mandating it through the OAS Charter and the 
Commission’s Statute to promote the observance and 
protection of human rights of the American peoples, 
have implicitly undertaken to implement measures of 
this nature where they are essential to preserving the 
Commission’s mandate.12
Thus, precautionary measures appear to be recognized by the 
Commission as an “inherent” power of its adjudicatory function in 
individual cases. Such interpretation is firmly grounded in several 
provisions of the Statute of the Commission, the OAS Charter, 
and the American Convention. Article 18 of the Statute authorizes 
the Commission “to request that the governments of the states pro-
vide it with reports on measures they adopt in matters of human 
rights.” Article 106 of the OAS Charter entrusts the Commission 
to, “promote the observance and protection of human rights.” 
Regarding states not yet party to the American Convention, 
Article 20 of the Commission Statute empowers the Commission 
“to examine communications submitted to it and any other avail-
able information, to address the government of any member state 
not a Party to the Convention for information deemed pertinent 
by this Commission, and to make recommendations to it, when 
it finds this appropriate, in order to bring about more effective 
observance of fundamental human rights.” For states that have 
ratified the American Convention, Article 41 of the Convention 
grants the Commission the power “to take action on petitions and 
other communications pursuant to its authority under the provi-
sions of Articles 44 through 51 of this Convention,” (provision 
that is restated in Article 19 of the Statute) and to “request the 
governments of the member states to supply it with information 
on the measures adopted by them in matters of human rights.” As 
all three instruments contemplate the promotion and observance 
of human rights but do not specify the means through which to 
do this, it is clear that the Commission has the authority to imple-
ment reasonable tools, such as precautionary measures, to fulfill 
its duty to protect and promote human rights.
Additionally, the Inter-American System was the first system 
to function in a region of the world where gross and sys-
tematic violations of human rights involving extra-judicial 
killings, torture, and forced disappearances were prevalent. 
Since its creation in 1948, the OAS 
has adopted multiple treaties, includ-
ing the Inter-American Convention 
on Forced Disappearances of Persons, 
the Inter-American Convention 
to Prevent and Punish Torture, and 
the Inter-American Convention on 
the Prevention, Punishment, and 
Eradication of Violence Against 
Women (Belém Do Pará).13 These 
treaties all imply the need to have 
protective measures granted by the 
Commission and the Court, par-
ticularly the Convention on Forced 
Disappearances of Persons, thus supporting the legality of 
IACHR precautionary measures.14
bIndIng nature
Precautionary measures are not only authorized in the nor-
mative structure that regulates the Commission, but compliance 
by Member States of the OAS is also obligatory. States must 
comply with their obligations under the basic principle of the 
law of international responsibility and their obligations under 
international treaties in good faith (pacta sunt servanda) in con-
formity with Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties of 1969.15 Thus, states cannot excuse non-compliance 
on the basis of their domestic law. When states fail to adhere 
to international human rights law by ignoring orders issued by 
an international body exercising its statutory or conventional 
authority, the state runs counter to the object and purpose of the 
human rights regime, therefore violating the international instru-
ments that govern the Commission’s functions. Furthermore, 
such conduct by a state undermines international law and the 
broader multinational political support for expanded interna-
tional protection of human rights.16
In this vein, the Commission has reiterated that “its ability 
to effectively investigate and determine capital cases has been 
frequently undermined when states have scheduled and car-
ried out the execution of condemned persons, despite the fact 
that those individuals have proceedings pending before the 
Commission.”17 Furthermore, the Commission determined that 
when a Member State dismisses such orders, the State “disre-
gards its fundamental human rights obligations under the OAS 
Charter and related instruments.”18 The Inter-American Court 
[I]t is clear that the 
Commission has the authority 
to implement reasonable tools, 
such as precautionary measures, 
to fulfill its duty to protect and 
promote human rights.
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has also pointed out that, based on the principles of effectiveness 
and good faith, States are to respect its provisional measures as 
well as the Commission’s precautionary measures.19 In doing 
so, States must “heed the recommendations contained in the 
Commission’s reports and do their best to implement them, 
pursuant to the principle of good faith.”20
The binding nature of the precautionary measures ordered 
by the Commission,
depends on the general duty of the states to respect and 
guarantee human rights, to adopt the legislative or other 
measures necessary for effective observance of human 
rights, and to carry out in good faith the obligations 
contracted under the American Convention and the 
Charter of the OAS, as well as the competence of the 
Commission to oversee that the states parties are carrying  
out the commitments they have assumed.21
The Commission also reaffirmed the legally binding nature 
of its precautionary measures in its Resolution 1/05 of March 8, 
2005, along with other documents issued by the Commission, 
holding that Member States are under a duty to comply in light 
of the fundamental role that the measures play in maintaining the 
efficacy of the Commission’s mandates.22 Member States that 
fail to recongize the binding nature of precautionary measures ren-
der the measures and the regional protection system ineffectual. In 
response, the Commission has affirmed, on numerous occasions, 
the necessity and duty of OAS Member States to comply with 
the precautionary measures granted in order to properly and 
fully respect their international human rights obligations.23
The precautionary measures of the Inter-American 
Commission require States to comply without exception of 
domestic political or legal motives.24 Although precautionary 
measures are not recognized as binding by all Member States of 
the OAS, the measures should be afforded a comparable legal 
value as those resolutions that the Commission adopts regarding 
individual cases, such as reports on admissibility and/or merits. 
As indicated above, the international principles of pacta sunt 
servanda and good faith leave little room to interpret other-
wise. OAS States have conferred on the Commission extensive 
powers to promote and protect human rights under the Charter 
of the OAS, the Statute of the Commission, the American 
Convention and several other regional treaties. Furthermore, in 
that framework, States have authorized the Commission to receive 
individual complaints seeking to afford redress for the victims. 
Therefore, under these mandates, the Commission is allowed, 
and compelled, to articulate its powers in order to prevent, if 
possible, violations of human rights, especially regarding serious 
situations where danger is imminent and irreparable. To argue 
otherwise would lead us to the unreasonable assumption that 
States created the Commission with ample supervisory powers 
but deliberately decided to limit the Commission from cooperat-
ing with them to prevent serious human rights violations.
InterIm meaSureS of the human rIghtS  
commIttee and other adJudIcatory bodIeS
Other similar organs, such as the UN Human Rights 
Committee, have also considered their interim measures as 
obligatory. The Human Rights Committee, in Mansour Ahani v. 
Canada25 and Piandiong et al. v. The Philippines26 reaffirmed 
the binding character that interim measures of such a Committee 
have. The Committee articulated its legal rationale pursuant 
to the provisions of the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the prin-
ciple of good faith in cooperating with the Committee. The 
Committee indicated in Piandiong that interim measures
are essential to the Committee’s role under the Protocol. 
Flouting of the Rule, specially by irreversible measures 
such as the execution of the alleged victim or his/her 
deportation from the country, undermines the pro-
tection of the Covenant rights through the Optional 
Protocol.27
The Committee has a similar nature to that of the Inter-
American Commission; they both share comparable normative 
structures regarding interim measures and are both quasi-judicial 
organs supervising human rights treaties with an individual 
complaint mandate and the governing treaties in both cases 
do not expressly refer to interim measures. If we consider that 
the same approach taken by the Committee is applicable to 
the Commission’s precautionary measures, the clear conclu-
sion is that the Commission’s measures are authorized by the 
Convention, the Statute, and its Rule of Procedure, and that 
compliance of such measures by states is an obligation under 
those instruments, and non-compliance would be a violation of 
these regional instruments and therefore could entail the inter-
national responsibility of the State concerned.
It is worth mentioning that the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights, and 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have rendered similar 
pronouncements confirming the obligatory nature of protec-
tive measures.28 The European Court and the ICJ have done so 
even though their respective governing treaties do not expressly 
recognize such interim measures for those international bodies.
StatementS by other actorS
Other actors, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
have also conveyed their views about the importance of precau-
tionary measures. Public statements have been made addressing 
the binding nature of the measures in reference to the Brazilian 
government’s response to precautionary measures granted by 
the Commission, including in an open letter to OAS Secretary 
General José Miguel Insulza. NGOs, such as Conectas-Human 
Rights and the International Federation of Human Rights 
(FIDH), have emphasized the binding nature and importance of 
precautionary measures. FIDH recently stated in an open letter 
to Secretary General Insulza, “[W]e wish to emphasize that the 
precautionary measures issued by the Commission, although 
using the term ‘recommendation’ are binding on Member States 
of the OAS[.]”29 In addition, Conectas issued a public statement 
on the Brazilian government’s response to the Belo Monte case,30 
indicating that “[i]n accordance with the new IACHR regula-
tions, the Commission has the authority to request precautionary 
measures to avoid irreparable damages[.]”31 Furthermore, the 
Centro de Estudios en Derecho, Justicia y Sociedad (DeJusticia), 
Conectas, the Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL), 
the Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS), the Instituto 
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de Defensa Legal (IDL), and the Due Process of Law Foundation 
(DPLF) have stated that the Commission’s precautionary mea-
sures are an inherent power of this organ and that a consistent 
regional practice during more than two decades suggests the 
existence of a norm based on international customary law.32 All 
these organizations, as well as the Commission, have expressed 
concern over the lack of adherence to, and downplay of, precau-
tionary measures and they continue to emphasize the signifi-
cance and necessity of preserving them.33
Some commentS about the commISSIon’S PractIce  
and the current ‘reform’ debate
The Inter-American Commission is currently facing one 
of the most significant challenges in its history. For years, 
several Member States of the OAS 
have periodically advanced the idea 
of “strengthening” or “reforming” 
the System, but in the end, no addi-
tional political or financial support has 
been dispensed to the Inter-American 
Commission or the Inter-American 
Court. In fact, many of the calls for 
“reform” have come from some of the 
same States that have been under strict 
scrutiny of the System due to their pre-
carious human rights situation. These 
calls, therefore, appear to be a reaction 
by those States to supervisory actions 
of the Commission and the Court, and appear to be seeking to 
undermine the independence and autonomy of the Commission. 
Furthermore, one of the issues triggering such reaction has been 
precisely that of the precautionary measures in certain cases.
It is also important to mention that in recent years, the 
Commission, in coordination with the Inter-American Court, 
has remained in constant contact with all stakeholders of the 
System — victims, states, NGOs, academia — in a periodic pro-
cess of consultation, which has led to significant improvements 
in the procedures of the Commission. Many of the changes have 
been beneficial to the victims, such as allowing them to directly 
litigate their cases before the Court or advancing additional 
legal arguments to those initially accepted by the Commission, 
among many other positive adjustments. In addition, many other 
changes have also recognized the procedural rights of States 
in individual complaints by having a more rigorous review of 
jurisdiction and admissibility of cases or factual grounds to 
request precautionary measures. For example, only 15.8% of the 
petitions filed were accepted for processing in 2011 and only 
13.5% of the requests for precautionary measures were finally 
rendered in 2011.
It should also be noted that the Commission has issued more 
than 780 precautionary measures from 1995 to 2012, focusing 
mostly on the core basic rights recognized by the human rights 
instruments. A recent study has shown that the Commission 
has adopted a great majority of its measures in cases where life 
and personal integrity were at stake.34 This study indicates that 
measures adopted from 1996 to 2010 were issued to protect 
mainly civil and political rights, and “particularly the right to life 
(Article 4) with 599 measures and the right to humane treatment 
(Article 5) with 528 measures from a 
total of 688.”35 In very few cases has 
the Commission refered to other rights 
such as freedom of expression (24 
precautionary measures), health (18), 
property (12), political rights (3), work 
(3), cultural identity (3), or right to 
information (3). Evidently precaution-
ary measures have been used mostly 
in serious situations in which life or 
personal integrity of persons are at 
stake. This shows that the Commission 
has clearly exercised restraint when 
dealing with situations that involve 
more complex rights where the determination of “gravity” and 
“urgency” requires a more refined and cautious analysis.
Based on the information available, it is possible to dispel 
some of the most common misconceptions regarding the work of 
the Commission, specifically regarding precautionary measures. 
These studies show that the Commission has been quite deliber-
ate in focussing its measures to prevent the violation of the most 
basic rights. When granting precautionary measure requests, the 
Commision’s practices demonstrate a deliberate and cautious 
assessment of the request, looking to whether the situtation 
truly necessitates precautionary measures given its gravity and 
urgency. Thus, the concern of states with precautionary mea-
sures does not appear to be legitimate. Rather, such concern 
appears to be grounded in renewed sentiments of sovereignity in 
some states of the region, and may not be seeking to improve the 
protective tools of the Commission.
[M]any of the calls for 
“reform” have come from some 
of the same States that have 
been under strict scrutiny of the 
System due to their precarious 
human rights situation.
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